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Abstract
This paper examines the effects that the private selection of arbitrators have over
arbitrators’ incentives in deciding the cases before them and over the arbitrators’ im-
plied bias. These effects have important implications for the design of Arbitration rules
by Arbitration and Dispute Resolution providers, as well as by other organizations that
rely on arbitration for the resolution of disputes among their members.We show that
private selection of arbitrators might adversely affect the accuracy of arbitrators’ de-
cisions because arbitrators might want to make an incorrect decision when a correct
decision would carry the inference that they are biased. We compare the accuracy of
arbitrators’ decisions under different arbitrator selection procedures.
1 Introduction
An important distinction between private and public dispute resolution mechanisms is due
to the manner in which the relevant decision maker – arbitrator or adjudicator – is selected.
Whereas litigants have little influence over the assignment of a judge to their lawsuit, in
arbitration their approval of the arbitrator is often necessary. This paper examines the effect
that the private selection of arbitrators has over arbitrators’ incentives to decide the cases
before them in a neutral and unbiased manner.
Basic intuition suggests that allowing both litigants to veto arbitrators they believe to
be unfavorable to them implies that those arbitrators who are selected would be impartial
and unbiased. We call this the selection effect. Market forces would then drive arbitrators
to perform better because they would want to maintain a favorable reputation and increase
their prospects of being selected to arbitrate future disputes. We call arbitrators’ wish to be
selected in the future, the incentive effect of private selection. Arguably, private selection of
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arbitrators should improve the neutrality and accuracy of arbitration, compared with other
alternatives that leave the parties with no influence over the choice of adjudicator.1
In this paper we suggest that the incentive effect of private selection may in fact under-
mine the accuracy of arbitrators’ decisions. As we show, arbitrators who seek to establish
reputation for being impartial and independent may bias their decision against a party whom
they would seem to favor otherwise. Although some of the arbitrators who behave in this
way would be vetoed by litigants, others may not. Thus, the private selection of arbitrators
and its implied reputational concerns might undermine the attractiveness of the institution
of arbitration.
To put things more concretely, when litigants can be classified into well specified and
identifiable groups, they might be subject to arbitrators’ bias. Group identification may be
due to the side taken in a dispute (e.g., employers vs. employees, consumers or suppliers
vs. sellers, etc.) or to some other group characteristic such as ethnic origin (Fizel, 1996)
or gender (Bemmels, 1988). Since most arbitration decisions are confidential it is difficult
to verify their accuracy. The best information that a party may learn about an arbitrator’s
past performance would often be restricted to the arbitrator’s past Win/Loss decisions with
respect to the relevant identifiable groups. In such settings, the only way arbitrators can
establish reputation for being impartial is to avoid a series of decisions that might seem
biased against specific groups.
Consequently, arbitrators might want to make an incorrect decision when a correct deci-
sion would carry the inference that they are biased. For example, an arbitrator in employ-
ment disputes would not want to make too many decisions in favor of employers, because he
would then be perceived as prejudiced against employees who would veto him in the future.
The arbitrator therefore has an incentive to decide some cases against employers, even if he
knows these decisions to be wrong.
Rational litigants understand these reputational concerns, and take them into account
when they select an arbitrator. This has two important implications: First, litigants would
prefer experienced arbitrators who have already established a reputation for being unbiased.
These arbitrators’ reputation would be less affected by any single decision they make, and
therefore they would be less likely to bias their decisions due to reputational concerns. Sec-
ond, inexperienced arbitrators who are perceived to be biased in favor of a specific litigant
group may be vetoed by litigants of this same group because they might expect such arbi-
trators to decide against them just to appear unbiased. The interplay between arbitrators’
and litigants’ strategic considerations is analyzed in this paper.
The dynamics that is considered in this paper is not unique to arbitration. Prior literature
has recognized the adverse effects of potential bad reputation when only the agents’ actions
(but not the ‘the state of the world’) can be publicly observed. In such environments agents
may take actions contrary to their best judgment in order to avoid adverse inference about
1Clearly, this is not true if the arbitrator is chosen by one of the parties. In such cases, the arbitrator
would obivously be biased in favor of that party, both because of the selection and incentive effects.
their true types, especially when such inference would be followed by future social and
economic sanctions. This dynamics may constrain free speech and distort expert advice if
it is considered politically incorrect (Loury, 1994; Morris, 2001). It may also distort the
actions taken by professionals and experts such as lawyers, doctors or car mechanics, who
may avoid taking actions that promote their private interests, even if those actions are
best for their clients (Ely and Välimäki, 2003). In all such circumstances, the agent may
paradoxically deviate from the action that maximizes both his client’s and his own welfare,
only to demonstrate his commitment to pursue the client’s interests over his own. This
dynamics might even result in the collapse of specific markets, as both good and bad types’
service and advice may prove useless.
This paper applies the idea of bad reputation to arbitration. Unlike in other contexts, here
the expert- the arbitrator, has two principals - the litigants, with conflicting interests. This
implies that an arbitrator who biases its decision in one direction becomes more attractive for
one party but less attractive to the other party. Since either party may veto the arbitrator,
this dynamics may drive out of the market not only those arbitrators who are perceived to
be strongly biased in favor of one of the parties, but also those arbitrators who have a strong
reputation for being unbiased but are nevertheless expected to counter-bias their decision in
order to avoid adverse reputation.
Our findings have important implications for the design of Arbitration rules by Arbi-
tration and Dispute Resolution providers, as well as by other organizations that rely on
arbitration for the resolution of disputes among their members. As we demonstrate, Arbi-
tration providers vary in their arbitrator selection rules and in the information they provide
about their arbitrators and about those arbitrators’ past decisions. This paper’s framework
allows for comparison of the effects of different combinations of selection rules and informa-
tion available about arbitrators’ past performance over the expected neturality and accuracy
of arbitrators.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews the current literature on arbitration
selection and incentives. Section 3 reviews current arbitration selections procedures practiced
by major dispute resolution providers, their requirements for arbitrator neutrality, and the
information available for parties when they select their arbitrator. Section 4 presents our
model for the behavior of arbitrators who want to establish reputation for not being biased
and analyzes arbitrator selection and behavior under alternative selection regimes. Section
5 explores the effects of Appeal over arbitrators’ decisions and their neutrality. Section 6
compares the expected accurcy of arbitrators under the alternative selection regimes, and
therefore their respective attractiveness for prospective litigants. Section 7 concludes. All
proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 Literature Review
Arbitrator bias presents a significant handicap for the effectiveness of arbitration as a dispute
resolution mechanism. Therefore, a large part of the economic literature on arbitration has
focused on the fairness and neutrality of arbitration outcomes in contexts such as employment
arbitration (Sherwyn, Estreicher and Heise, 2005), securities brokerage dispute arbitration
(Choi, Fisch and Pritchard, 2008), investment treaty arbitrations (Franck, 2009), Consumer
arbitration (Searle Report, 2009), and Major Baseball League arbitration (Scully 1978).
Generally, the literature has tried to measure arbitration bias by analyzing either arbi-
tration awards or arbitrations win-loss rates.2 These were studied in two types of cases: one
where one litigant is a repeated player while the other is a one shot player,3 and the other
where either both litigants are repeat or or one-shot players.
In contexts where only one of the litigants is a repeat player it is expected that arbitrators
would tend to decide in favor of the repeat player, in order to be selected again to arbitrate
future disputes. Indeed, Tullock (1980) asserts that private selection would motivate arbitra-
tors to “choose a decision which is most likely to lead to his being selected for arbitration in
the future”.4 He conjectures that this may lead arbitrators to bias their decisions in contexts
such as consumer arbitration, where one of the parties (the retailer) uses arbitration more
often and has better information about potential arbitrators. This conjecture finds some
support in empirical research.5
When both players are one shot players, arbitrators are expected to try to avoid being
perceived as biased in favor of one of the parties. Thus, Ashenfelter and Bloom (1984) and
Ashenfelter (1987) report that arbitrator decisions exhibit no consistent bias. They explain
that arbitrators tend to avoid extreme decisions and decide disputes based on their prediction
of how other arbitrators would have decided the case.6
Other authors have speculated that arbitrators would tend to “split the difference” and
award each party a partial victory. As Posner (2005) suggests "this will make it difficult for
the parties on either side of the class of suits in question to infer a pattern of favoritism”.7
2Note, thought, that under Final Offer Arbitration, win-loss rates may be misleading. They may be
biased due to more conservative offers by one party as compared to the other. See Scully, 1986; Ashenfelter
& Bloom, 1983.
3For a first discussion of repeat players and one shot players in litigation see Galanter (1974).
4Tullock (1980), at p. 127.
5Choi, Fisch and Pritchard (2008) find that party control over the selection of arbitrators increases
arbitrators’ incentives to cater to the interests of brokers, who are repeat players in these arbitrations. They
find that investors are less able to screen among arbitrators’ bias when it is less visible (ideological bias, as
compared to conflict of interests, which is visible). The latter is also supported by Kondo (2009).
6Choi, Fisch and Pritchard (2008) find that party control over the selection of arbitrators increases
arbitrators’ incentives to cater to the interests of brokers, who are repeat players in these arbitrations. They
find that investors are less able to screen among arbitrators’ bias when it is less visible (ideological bias, as
compared to conflict of interests, which is visible).
7Posner (2005), at p. 1261. Empirical findings seem to arrive at different conclusions regarding this claim.
Compare Farber (1981), showing no such tendency, with Bloom (1986), demonstrating behavior which is
Bloom (1986) demonstrates behavior which is consistent with "splitting the difference" but
suggests alternative explanations for these findings. More recent empirical reserach finds no
support for this conjecture.8
Apart from arbitrator bias, a number of studies have tried to examine how litigants select
arbitrators. Thus, Bloom and Cavanagh (1986)9 examine the preferences of employers and
unions in pay dispute arbitration. They show that both employers and unions preferred more
experienced arbitrators, yet each had a preference for arbitrators whose win-loss tallies under
final offer arbitration tended in its favor. Arbitration selection was also studied in NASD
broker arbitrations by Choi, Fisch and Pritchard (2009) and Kiro (2009). Both find that
broker firms’ greater experience in arbitration allows them better control over the selection
of arbitrators, who demonstrate bias in their favor.
3 Arbitrator Selection in Major Arbitration Organiza-
tions
Dispute resolution providers’ codes and arbitration rules exhibit significant concern for ar-
bitrator neutrality. Thus, all three largest American arbitration providers (American Arbi-
tration Association (AAA), Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services (JAMS), and the
National Arbitration Forum (NAF)) provide in their Due Process protocols for the neutrality
of selected arbitrators.10 Moreover, review of the qualifications that must be met by arbi-
trators on these providers’ rosters,11 as well as on other international institutions,12 reveals
that they all guarantee that their arbitrators are free from bias and prejudice.
Most arbitration providers allow the parties to structure their own arbitrator selection
consistent with "splitting the difference" although suggesting alternative explanations for these findings.
8See Keer and Naimark, 2001; Searle Civil Justice Institute, Commercial Arbitration, Preliminary report
available on http://searlearbitration.org/p/full_report.pdf.
9For an analysis of arbitrators when their decision is not binding and may be followed by a jury trial see
Wittman (2003).
10See Appendix 3, Preliminary Report: Consumer Arbitrations Before the American Arbitration Associa-
tion, Searle Civil Justice Institute (2009), available at http://www.searlearbitration.org/p/full_report.pdf.
11See, e.g., Qualification Criteria for Admittance to the AAA National Roster of Arbitra-
tors, available on http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=4223; JAMS’ Arbitrator Ethics Guidelines, avialable
on http://www.jamsadr.com/arbitrators-ethics; NAF Code of Conduct for Arbitrators, available at
http://www.adrforum.com/users/naf/resources/CodeOf ConductForArbitrators1.pdf..
12See, for example, the CPR (the International Institute for Conflict Prevention
& Resoloution) The Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes, avail-
able on http://www.cpradr.org/ClausesRules/ArbitrationEthics/tabid/80/Default.aspx; Ar-
ticles 9-12 of the Swiss Chamber’s Court of Arbitration and Mediation’s Rules of In-
ternational Arbitration, available at https://www.sccam.org/sa/download/SRIA_english.pdf;
Article 5.2 of the LCIA (London Court of International Arbitration) Rules of Ar-
bitration, avaialble on http://www.lcia.org/ARB_folder/arb_english_main.htm; Articl
14 of the SCC (Stockholm Chamber of Commerce) Arbitration Rules, available on
http://www.sccinstitute.com/filearchive/3/32181/Arbitration%20Rules_2010_eng_final.pdf.
procedures instead of relying on the provider’s default rule. In structuring their selection
procedures the parties are not constrained to procedures that are offered by the provider,
and they may also name the arbitrator that would decide their dispute in their arbitration
agreement. Yet, if the agreement does not name the arbitrator or specifies a method for ap-
pointing the arbitrator then the provider’s selection rules apply.13 Examination of arbitration
organizations’ rules for selecting arbitrators demonstrates much variation, as different rules
allow the litigants varying degrees of control over the selection process.14 Furthermore, large
arbitration organizations, most prominently the AAA, provide different arbitrator selection
rules for different types of arbitrations they handle.
Some of the rules employed by arbitration providers allow the arbitration provider full
discretion in selecting the arbitrator from its roster, which consists of arbitrators that satisfy
the provider’s requirements and have registered with it.15 Under these procedures, the parties
cannot veto the arbitrator unless they show good cause for doing so.
Other selection procedures allow the parties more control over the selection of arbitrators,
either by allowing them to veto an arbitrator without cause or by asking the parties to rank
arbitrators according to their preferences. Thus, the provider may offer the parties a short
list of arbitrators and allow each of them to veto a number of arbitrators on that list. The
number of allowed vetoes may either be restricted,16 or not.17 If the number of arbitrators
that survive a veto by both parties is larger than one then the arbitrator is either selected by
the provider,18 or according to combined rankings provided by the parties for the arbitrators
they did not veto.19 Alternatively, the parties may be required to rank the arbitrators on the
short list without vetoing any of them, and the selected arbitrator would be the one whose
combined rank is highest.20
To allow litigants meaningful selection, arbitration providers furnish the litigants with
information about potential arbitrators’ education, professional experience, and qualifica-
tions.21 Yet, since arbitration decisions are usually confidential, and since the arbitrator is
13Since arbitration may be held before a single arbitrator or before a panel of (usually) three arbitrators,
the selection mechanism also depends on the form of arbitration to be held. We focus on single arbitrator
selection only.
14Most arbitration providers allow each party to challenge an appointed arbitrator for cause. Such chal-
lenge would often be decided by the arbitration provider. We focus here on the possible veto that may be
exercised by each party without cause (and thus without being subject to any further review).
15See for example Rule 52(a) of the AAA Expedited Procedures for Commercial Finance Rules; Rule R-10
of the AAA Insurance Arbitration Rule; Article 9(3) of the ICC Rules of Arbitration; Article 5.5 of the LCIA
Rules of Arbitration.
16See for example, AAA Expedited Procedures for Commercial Dispute, Rule E-4; NAF Arbitration Rules,
Rule 21.
17See, for example AAA Commercial Finance Arbitration Rules, Rule 13.
18See, for example AAA Commercial Finance Arbitration Rules, Rule 13.
19See, for example AAA Contrruction Arbitration Rule, Rule R-14.
20See, for example, AAA Internet Arbitration Rules, Rule 7; CPR Non-Administered Arbitration Rules,
Rule 6.4.
21See, for example, JAMS’ list of neutrals on
http://www.jamsadr.com/professionals/xpqProfResults.aspx?xpST=ProfessionalResults
not required to explain or justify her decision, litigants have little information concerning
the arbitrator’s prior decisions. Moreover, arbitration usually takes one of two types – con-
ventional arbitration, in which the arbitrator decides the case as she sees fit, and final offer
arbitration, in which each party submits an offer to the arbitrator who must then select
one of these offers. Clearly, the arbitrator’s decision in final offer arbitration provides no
information beyond the offer chosen.
Still, by inquiring with prior litigants and attorneys, litigants can obtain information
regarding an arbitrator’s prior decisions. Furthermore, in some types of final offer arbitra-
tions, there is publicly available data on prior arbitration decisions.22 Recently, one major
arbitration provider, the CPR, has even started collecting information over arbitrators’ past
performance and providing it to its clients.23
To simplify the analysis we divide the current institutional arrangements of arbitrator
selection rules and information regarding proposed arbitrators into three categories: In the
first category, which we refer to as ‘No Veto’, arbitrators are randomly selected by the
arbitration provider. In the second category, which we refer to as ‘Veto + Unobservable
Information’, arbitrators are selected by litigants who do not have access to information
about the arbitrators’ past decisions. Finally, in the third category, which we refer to as ‘Veto
+ Observable Information’, arbitrators are selected by litigants and litigants have access to
information about the arbitrators’ past decisions. We examine the effects of private selection
and arbitrator reputation over the expected bias of the chosen arbitrator and her incentives
in a stationary equilibrium in each of these three possible institutional categories.
4 A Model of Arbitrator Incentives and Bias
A dispute involves two litigants. For convenience, litigants are identified as Plaintiff and
Defendant. In practice, the important identification of parties may be independent of their
procedural roles as plaintiff or defendant as, for example, in the case of disputes between
Employers and Employees, where the suit may be filed by either side. We therefore use the
plaintiff–defendant identification for convenience only.
Each litigant believes itself to be right with subjective probability p > 1/2 in the dispute
in which it is involved. That is, each litigant believes that if the arbitrator were to decide
correctly, then it would decide in its favor with probability p.24 But in any other dispute, each
22Notably, section 1281.96 of the California Code of Civil Procedure requires any private arbitration com-
pany that administers or is otherwise involved in a consumer arbitration to collect and publish information
about each consumer arbitration it handeled in the preceding five years. Major Baseball League’s final offer
arbitration outcomes are also publicly available, and so are arbitration outcomes in some federal government
sectors. ****check***
23See http://www.cpradr.org/CPRNeutrals/NEWPositivelyNeutralEvaluations/tabid/434/Default.aspx
24This assumption corresponds to ‘over-optimism’ which underlies the basic model of litigation and settle-
ment (see, e.g. Posner, 1973) and has been substantiated by empirical and experimental findings (see ****).
Note, however, that over-optimism only requires that the sum of the plaintiff’s and defendant’s estimates
litigant believes that the plaintiff and defendant are equally likely to be right, independently
across different disputes. Each litigant obtains a payoff of 1 if it wins the dispute, and −1 if
it loses. Payoffs are discounted at a rate δ < 1 in each selection round.
An arbitrator can be either biased in favor of the defendant (pro-defendant), biased in
favor of the plaintiff (pro-plaintiff), or unbiased. A pro-defendant arbitrator always decides in
favor of the defendant and a pro-plaintiff arbitrator always decides in favor of the plaintiff.
An unbiased arbitrator obtains a payoff of 1 if it decides correctly in favor of the right
party, and a payoff of 0 if it decides incorrectly in favor of the wrong party. We assume for
simplicity that unbiased arbitrators get an accurate signal about the correct decision in the
case before them. An unbiased arbitrator also discounts its future payoffs at the rate δ < 1.
We assume that δ is large enough so that an unbiased arbitrator prefers to make one wrong
decision followed by two correct decisions than just one correct decision. This is equivalent
to assuming that δ + δ2 ≥ 1. As we show below, this assumption implies that under a ‘Veto
+ Observable Information’ regime, reputational effects are sufficiently strong to affect the
behavior of unbiased arbitrators.
Each arbitrator is characterized by a prior belief that the disputing parties hold about
the direction of its bias. For simplicity, we assume that an arbitrator is either believed to be
pro-defendant with probability βD and unbiased with the complimentary probability 1−βD,
or pro-plaintiff with probability βP and unbiased with probability 1 − βP . We refer to βD
or βP as the arbitrator’s type. We further assume that the distribution F from which the
arbitrators’ types are chosen is symmetric over βD and βP .25
We focus on symmetric (over βD and βP ) stationary pure strategy perfect Bayesian
equilibria of this game in which the probability that arbitrators are employed is maximal,
and in which, when indifferent, arbitrators employ strategies that maximize the likelihood
that they would be employed again both on and off the equilibrium path. In these maximal
equilibria, unbiased arbitrators refrain from using weakly dominated “silly strategies,” such as
always deciding in favor of one party regardless of their type, that would have them vetoed.
And, arbitrators who do not expect to be employed in equilibrium still adopt strategies that
maximize the likelihood that they would be employed again if they are employed by mistake.
For simplicity, we refer to such ‘symmetric stationary maximal perfect Bayesian equilibria’
simply as ‘equilibria’ below.
4.1 No Veto
Consider first the simple regime where litigants are offered an arbitrator who is randomly
chosen from the roster of arbitrators. Thus, a plaintif-defendant pair is assigned an arbitrator
whose type and experience are drawn from a symmetric distribution F̂ over arbitrators’
of their probabilities to pervail in trial be greater than 1. For simplicity, we make the more restrictive
assumption that both probabilities are symmetric and greater than 1/2.
25Our results would continue to hold as long as the distribution of arbitrators’ types in not too asymmetric.
types.26 Neither litigant can veto the proposed arbitrator. This regime is practiced by public
courts, as well as by a number of arbitration providers who specialize in the resolution of
international disputes.
Under this regime, biased arbitrators decide according to their bias, and unbiased arbi-
trators decide correctly, since they have nothing to gain from deciding otherwise.
4.2 Veto with Unobservable Arbitrators’ Decisions
In this subsection, we consider the following game. A plaintif-defendant pair is offered an
arbitrator whose type and experience are drawn from a distribution F̂ . If at least one of the
litigants vetoes the arbitrator, then the litigants are offered another arbitrator whose type is
drawn from F̂ , and another one, until neither of them vetoes the arbitrator. If an arbitrator
is not vetoed then he decides the case. Then another plaintiff-defendant pair is assigned an
arbitrator from the same distribution F̂ and so on.
In this game, biased arbitrators decide according to their bias, and unbiased arbitrators
decide correctly because the fact that their decisions are unobservable implies that, once
they are employed, arbitrators have nothing to gain from deciding otherwise.
A stationary equilibrium and a distribution of arbitrators’ types and experience, F̂ ,
induce expected discounted payoffs for the plaintiff and defendant if they veto the arbitrator
that is offered to them and proceed to play according to their equilibrium strategies. We
denote these payoffs by dP and dD, for the plaintiff and the defendant, respectively. Denote
by uP (β) and uD (β) the expected payoff to the plaintiff and defendant, respectively, if they
employ arbitrator β. Then, the expected discounted payoffs dP and dD have to satisfy the
following two equations (where the uncertainty is over the arbitrator’s type β):
dP = Pr (arbitrator β is not vetoed)E [uP (β) | arbitrator β is not vetoed ]
+Pr (arbitrator β is vetoed) δdP
and
dD = Pr (arbitrator β is not vetoed)E [uD (β) | arbitrator β is not vetoed ]
+Pr (arbitrator β is vetoed) δdD.
The fact that litigants can repeatedly veto any arbitrator who is offered to them implies that
dP , dD ≥ 0 in equilibrium. Since we focus on symmetric equilibria, dP = dD ≡ d.
The arbitrators’ behavior in equilibrium is the same as under the ‘No Veto’ regime.
Since litigants have no information about arbitrators’ past decisions, these cannot affect
arbitrators’ prospects of being chosen to arbitrate future disputes. Thus, unbiased arbitrators
always decide correctly.
26In a stationary equilibrium, a symmetric distribution F over arbitrators’ types induces a stationary
distribution F̂ over arbitrators’ types and experience.
The next proposition describes the equilibrium behavior of litigants. Denote by I the
highest prior βD or βP above which an arbitrator would be vetoed by the plaintiff or defen-
dant, respectively. As shown below, I is given by the expression
I ≡ 2p− 1− δd
2p
.
Proposition 1. Under the ‘Veto+Unobservable Information’ regime, in any equilibrium of
the game I > 0 and an arbitrator with type βD or βP is employed if and only if
0 ≤ βD, βP ≤ I.
Equilibrium behavior is described in Figure 1 below.
Figure 1: Equilibrium Behavior in the case of No Veto
Intuitively, any arbitrator who is believed to be too biased in either direction is vetoed
by one of the litigants while arbitrators who are believed to be sufficiently unbiased are
employed. The cut-off belief I is determined by the trade-off between the expeted benefit of
employing the arbitrator of type β that is proposed to the litigants and by the discounted
expected payoff from vetoing arbitrator β and being offered another arbitrator from the
distribution F . Since the arbitrators’ decisions are unobservable, reputational considerations
play no role in equilibrium.
4.3 Veto with Observable Arbitrators’ Decisions
In this subsection, we consider the following game. A plaintif-defendant pair is offered an
arbitrator whose type and experience are drawn from a distribution F̂ . If at least one of the
litigants vetoes the arbitrator, then the litigants are offered another arbitrator whose type is
drawn from F̂ , and another one, until neither of them vetoes the arbitrator. If an arbitrator
is not vetoed then he decides the case, and his decision becomes public. Yet, no one can tell
whether the arbitrator’s decision was correct or not. The arbitrator is then offered to decide
another dispute, until he decides three disputes or until he is vetoed. We focus on stationary
equilibria in which once an arbitrator is vetoed, it will be vetoed by all future litigants.
In equilibrium, an unbiased arbitrator renders a correct decision in the third time in which
it is employed because this is its last decision and so it has nothing to gain from deciding
otherwise. It also renders a correct decision in the second time in which it is employed
because, by assumption, the payoff to the arbitrator from making just one correct decision
is larger than the sum of payoffs from making an incorrect decision in the current period
followed by a correct decision in the next period. We thus have the following proposition.
Proposition 2. In any equilibrium of the game, an unbiased arbitrator renders a correct
decision in the second and third times in which it is employed.
Proposition 2 shows that an experienced arbitrator does not take her reputation into
account when making a decision: if she is unbiased then she makes what she believes to
be the correct decision. This is because the effect of any single decision on the reputation
of an experienced arbitrator (good or bad) is relatively small and so it is ignored by the
arbitrator. Thus, as far as incentive effects go, experienced arbitrators behave the same
under all regimes. As we show below, this is not the case for inexperienced arbitrators,
whose reputation is more sensitive to the type of decisions they make.
As in the case of veto and unobservable information, a stationary equilibrium and a
distribution of arbitrators’ types and experience, F̂ , induce expected discounted payoffs for
the plaintiff and defendant if they veto the arbitrator that is offered to them and proceed
to play according to their equilibrium strategies. We denote these payoffs by dP and dD, for
the plaintiff and the defendant, respectively. Again, as in the case of veto and unobservable
information, dP , dD ≥ 0 and dP = dD ≡ d in equilibrium.
Proposition 2 describes the behavior of experienced arbitrators in equilibrium. The next
proposition describes the behavior of litigants who are faced with an experienced arbitrator.
Denote by Iex the highest prior βD or βP above which an experienced arbitrator would be
vetoed by the plaintiff or defendant, respectively. As shown below, Iex = I.
Proposition 3. Under the ‘Veto+Observable Information’ regime, in any equilibrium Iex =
I > 0, and an experienced arbitrator with type βD or βP is employed if and only if
0 ≤ βD, βP ≤ I.
The proof of Proposition 3 is similar to the proof of Proposition 1, because by Proposition
2, experienced unbiased arbitrators decide correctly, just like in the ‘Veto + Unobserable
Information’ regime.
Propositions 2 and 3 describe the equilibrium behavior of experienced (unbiased) arbitra-
tors and the litigants who face them (the behavior of biased arbitrators is fixed). Experienced
unbiased arbitrators who are not perceived as too biased in favor of one of the litigants are
not vetoed. They decide cases correctly, and ignore reputational considerations. However,
experienced arbitrators who are perceived as too biased are vetoed.
The fact that experienced arbitrators who are perceived as too biased are vetoed implies
that inexperienced unbiased arbitrators seek to avoid developing such a reputation. Next we
analyze the behavior and selection of inexperienced unbiased arbitrators in equilibrium.
The equilibrium behavior of inexperienced (unbiased) arbitrators who have never been
employed before depends on an endogenously determined threshold, which we denote by β.
As shown below, any inexperienced unbiased arbitrator whose type is βD, βP > β decides
against the party it is suspected to favor (namely, in favor of the plaintiff or defendant,
respectively). The unbiased arbitrator decides this way in an attempt to improve its rep-
utation. Inexperienced unbiased arbitrators whose type are βD, βP ! β decide the dispute
correctly.
As shown in the Appendix, β is given by the expression
β ≡ 2p− 1− δd
2p+ 1 + δd
.
Proposition 4. Under the ‘Veto+Observable Information’ regime, in equilibrium, inexperi-
enced unbiased arbitrators decide the case correctly if βD, βP ≤ β, and decide in favor of the
plaintiff and defendant, respectively, if βD, βP > β. Inexperienced arbitrators are employed
if and only if βD, βP ≤ β.27
Equilibrium behavior when inexpereience arbitrators are proposed to decide a dispute is
described in Figure 2 below.
Figure 2: Equilibrium Behavior in the case of Veto with Observable Arbitrators’ Decisions
27ZN: verify that proof shows that with λ = 0, min
{
β, Iex
}
= β...
Proposition 4 demonstrates the consequences of inexperienced arbitrators’ reputational
concerns. Inexperienced unbiased arbitrators whose type βD is above β would decide in
favor of plaintiffs, irrespective of the correct outcome, only to establish their reputation as
unbiased.28 Similarly, inexperience unbiased arbitrators whose type is βP would decide in
favor of defendants. Unbiased inexperienced arbitrators behave in this way even though they
realize that this makes them less attractive to the party they are suspected to favor. In fact,
that party would veto them if the probability they are biased in her favor is not sufficiently
high. Once this probability is sufficiently high, then they would, of course, be vetoed by the
other party. Consequently, inexperienced arbitrators whose type βD or βP is between β and
Iex or higher are vetoed in equilibrium.
5 Appeal
We now assume that a proportion λ > 0 of all disputes are appealed so that the correct
decision is ultimately made in them. The possibility of appeal is taken into account by the
litigants and by unbiased arbitrators. This assumption may be interpreted also as if an
arbitrator is bound by ethical or any other internal constraints to make the correct decision
with probability λ, assuming that the litigants cannot observe such arbitrator’s inclination
by the time they make their selection decision.
In the case of ‘No Veto’, the possibility of appeal obviously does not affect the behavior of
litigants or arbitrators (beyond, of course, the fact that arbitrators are constrained to make
the correct decision with probability λ as explained above).
As shown in Proposition 5 below, in the case of ‘Veto + Unobservable Information’ about
arbitrators’ decisions, the possibility of appeal shifts up the veto threshold I, but does not
otherwise change equilibrium behavior, which remains qualitatively similar to the behavior
that is described in Proposition 1. The reason for the change in the value of the threshold I
is that the possibility of appeal implies that litigants need not be as concerned about possible
arbitrator bias.
Denote by I (λ) the highest prior βD or βP above which an arbitrator would be vetoed by
the plaintiff or defendant, respectively, when arbitrators are constrained to make the correct
decision with probability λ ≥ 0. As shown below, I (λ)is given by the expression
I (λ) ≡ 2p− 1− δd
2p (1− λ) .
Proposition 5. Under the ‘Veto+Unobservable Information’ regime, in any equilibrium of
the game I (λ) > 0 for any probability of appeal λ ≥ 0 and an arbitrator with type βD or
βP is employed if and only if
0 ≤ βD, βP ≤ I (λ) .
28Although such arbitrators are not employed in equilibrium, they still adopt strategies that maximize the
likelihood that they would be employed again in the event that they are employed (out of equilibrium).
However, as shown in Proposition 6 below, under the ‘Veto + Observable Arbitrators’
regime, the possibility of appeal also has a qualitative effect on the equilibrium behavior
that is described in Proposition 4.
If litigants may appeal arbitrators’ decisions then in addition to β, which now depends
on λ and is given by the expression
β (λ) ≡ 2p− 1− δd
2p+ 1− 4λp+ δd.
the equilibrium behavior of inexperienced (unbiased) arbitrators who have never been em-
ployed before also depends on two other endogenously determined thresholds. The threshold
denoted I in (λ) describes the highest prior βD or βP above which an inexperienced arbitrator
would be vetoed by the plaintiff if unbiased inexperienced arbitrators are believed to decide
in favor of the plaintiff, or by the defendant if unbiased inexperienced arbitrators are believed
to decide in favor of the defendant. As shown below, I in (λ) is given by the expression
I in (λ) ≡ 1− 2λ (1− p)− δd
2− 2λ .
The threshold denoted I in (λ) describes the lowest prior βD or βP below which an inexpe-
rienced arbitrator would be vetoed by the defendant if unbiased inexperienced arbitrators
are believed to decide in favor of the plaintiff, or by the plaintiff if unbiased inexperienced
arbitrators are believed to decide in favor of the defendant. As shown below, I in (λ) is given
by the expression
I in (λ) ≡
1− 2pλ+ δd
2− 2pλ .
Proposition 5 implies that I (λ) > 0 and hence that δd < 2p− 1. As shown below, I in (λ) ≤
I in (λ) for all values of p ≥ 1/2 and λ < 1 provided that δd < λ (2p− 1) .
Proposition 6. Under the ‘Veto+Unobservable Information’ regime, if litigants may appeal
arbitrators’ decisions (λ > 0) , then in equilibrium inexperienced unbiased arbitrators who
are employed decide the case correctly if βD, βP ≤ β (λ), and decide in favor of the plaintiff
and defendant, respectively, if βD, βP > β (λ) . The equilibrium behavior of litigants depends
on the relationship among the values min
{
β (λ) , I (λ)
}
, I in (λ), and I in (λ), as follows:
– If min
{
β, I (λ)
} ≤ I in (λ) ≤ I in (λ), then an inexperienced arbitrator βD or βP
is employed if and only if βD, βP ≤ min
{
β, I (λ)
}
or I in (λ) ≤ βD, βP ≤ I in (λ),
respectively.
– If I in (λ) ≤ min
{
β, I (λ)
} ≤ I in (λ), then an inexperienced arbitrator βD or βP is
employed if and only if βD, βP ≤ I in (λ), respectively, and
– if I in (λ) ≤ I in (λ) ≤ β (λ), then an inexperienced arbitrator βD or βP is employed if
and only if βD, βP ≤ min
{
β (λ) , I (λ)
}
, respectively. Finally,
– if I in (λ) > I in (λ), then an inexperienced arbitrator βD or βP is employed if and only
if βD, βP ≤ min
{
β (λ) , I (λ)
}
, respectively.
Equilibrium behavior is described graphically in Figure 3 below. Notice that arbitrators
behave in the same way they do with no possibility appeal (Proposition 4). Namely, biased
arbitrators decide according to their bias, and unbiased arbitrators decide correctly if the
probability they are believed to be biased is small, but decide against the party they are
believed to favor if the probability they are believed to be biased is above a threshold β (λ).
Litigants veto arbitrators whom they believe to be biased with a high probability, and
employ arbitrators whom they believe to be biased with a small probability. However, unlike
in the case where there is no possibility of appeal, in the first and second cases described in
Proposition 6, some inexperienced arbitrators are employed in equilibrium even if they are
expected to render biased decisions: if they are biased, then they decide in favor of whoever
they are biased for; and if they are unbiased, then they decide against whoever they are
suspected of being biased for.
Notice also that the litigants’ veto decision need not be monotone in their beliefs: they
may employ an arbitrator who is believed to be biased with a small probability; veto an
arbitrator who is believed to be biased with a higher probability, and employ an arbitrator
who is believed to be biased with a yet higher probability. The reason for this behavior
is that the defendant, say, would veto an arbitrator who is believed to decide correctly if
unbiased but may be pro-plaintiff; but would not object to an arbitrator who is believed
to be pro-plaintiff with a higher probability but who decides in favor of the defendant if
unbiased.
Figure 3: Nonmonotone Equilibrium Behavior in the case of Veto with Observable
Arbitrators’ Decisions with the Possibility of Appeal
6 The Optimal Arbitrator Selection Regime
We can now compare the alternative selection regimes. After the dispute breaks the parties’
interests are not aligned, because each would like to prevail in the dispute. The problem
ceases to be one of creating efficient incentives to perform the contract, and becomes one of
a purely distributive character.29 If arbitrators may be biased in favor of one party or the
other then each party would like the arbitrator to be as biased in his favor, since this would
increase his chances of prevailing. If arbitrators can only be biased in favor of one of the
parties, then that party would want an arbitrator who is most biased in his favor, whereas
his counterparty would want to choose the least biased arbitrator. Either way, the parties’
interests with respect to the arbitrator’s bias would conflict.
However, at the time of contracting, before the dispute, parties share an interest in
guaranteeing adequate performance of the contract.30 If they could write a complete contract,
then they would specify the preferred outcome for each future state of the world, and would
like an arbitrator to implement this outcome. If a complete contract is not feasible, then
they would like the arbitrator to implement the outcome they would have preferred, had
they been able to write it in advance. In both cases, contracting parties share the same
interests in the accuracy and neutrality of the arbitrator. Neither one of them wants the
arbitrator to be biased, even if such bias is in her favor, because this would imply different
performance incentives than the ones both parties seek to implement. If for whatever reason
the parties do want the outcome to be biased in favor of one of them, then they would
specify the substantive terms of the contract accordingly, but want those terms to be applied
with the highest possible accuracy.31 Therefore, assuming all other costs of contracting and
disputes are kept constant, the pre-dispute welfare of a contracting party is increasing in
the probability that the arbitrator makes a correct decision. We compare the three regimes
according to this welfare criterion.
When there is no appeal all unbiased arbitrators who are not vetoed render a correct
decision. Therefore, we can focus on the selection of arbitrators under the three regimes.
Under the ‘No Veto’ regime no arbitrator is vetoed, so there is no selection. Under the
‘Veto+ Unobservable Information’ regime arbitrators whose probability of being biased is
greater than I are vetoed. Thus, this regime pareto dominates the ‘No Veto’ regime.
Comparison of the ‘Veto+Observable Information’ and the ‘Veto+Unobservable Infor-
29The parties may have non-distributive concerns in minimizing their litigation costs. This is the reason
why they would prefer to settle their dispute than litigate it.
30The discussion here follows Tullock (1980), at 127-129, among others.
31There are cases where contracting parties would prefer arbitrators’ decisions to be less accurate. Gen-
erally, this would be the case whenever the performance incentives generated by a more accurate decision
would not justify the costs of such higher accuracy. For example, if the parties cannot determine at the time
of contracting nor at the time of performance the exact harm from a breach, then accurately determining
this harm after the dispute would not change the incentives to breach. It would therefore be wasteful, and
the parties would prefer a less accurate arbitrator, if his costs would be lowerThe value of accuracy of dispute
resolution has been extensively analyzed by Kaplow (1994), Kaplow and Shavell (1994, 1996).
mation’ regimes is more complicated. Litigants employ the same veto threshold, I, for
experienced arbitrators, under both regimes. Yet, since under the ‘Veto+Observable Infor-
mation’ regime the posterior over an arbitrator’s bias is updated after each decision it makes,
some experienced arbitrators are vetoed based on their past decision, whereas they would
not be vetoed under the ‘Veto+Observable Information’ regime.
As for inexperienced arbitrators, their selection is tighter under the ‘Veto+Observable
Information’ regime as they are vetoed if their type is greater than β < I. This selection
effect is far from being obvious. Litigants’ information about inexperienced arbitrators is the
same under both regimes, so one would expect their selection also to be identical. The reason
why selection is tighter under the ‘Veto+Observable Information’ regime is that arbitrators
are vetoed by litigants who they seem to favor. The reputational concerns of these arbitrators
motivate them to decide against the litigants they seem to favor, and therefore it is those
same litigants who veto them.
Overall, absent appeal the three regimes can be pareto ranked according to their expected
probability of screening out biased arbitrators and rendering a correct decision. Since incen-
tive effects are never pronounced in equilibrium, or, put differently, since unbiased arbitrators
who are not vetoed in equilibrium always decide correctly, the ‘Veto+Observable Informa-
tion’ regime pareto dominates the ‘Veto+Unobservable Information’ regime, which, in turn,
dominates the ‘No Veto’ regime.
With appeal, the ordering of the three regimes according to their selection effects re-
mains qualitatively unchanged, although the veto threshold depends on the probability of
appeal. However, comparison of the three regimes has to account also for the incentive effect
over unbiased arbitrators, which is pronounced under the ‘Veto+Observable Information’
regime. As Proposition 6 demonstrates, inexperienced unbiased arbitrators whose type be-
longs to an intermediate range are employed in equilbirium and bias their decision against
the party they are suspected to favor. Thus, the overall probability of a correct decision
under the ‘Veto+Observable Information’ regime may therefore be either higher or lower
than the two other regimes, depending on the distribution of arbitrator types. If this distri-
bution is concentrated on the range in which unbiased arbitratros decide correctly, then the
‘Veto+Observable Information’ regime is superior to the other two in terms of the expected
probability of the correct decision being made, but if this distribution is concentrated on the
range in which unbiased arbitratros decide against the party they are suspected to favor,
then the ‘Veto+Observable Information’ regime may be inferior to the other two regimes.
[Put here example that illustrates that the welfare comparison between
‘Veto+Unobservable Information’ and ‘Veto+Observable Information’ regimes
can go either way ...]
Appeal is costly. The merit of appeal under the ‘Veto+Observable Information’ regime
depends on the relative magnitude of three different effects: (1) Appeal corrects some in-
accurate decision; (2) as shown above, appeal improves selection; and (3) as shown above,
appeal may undermine the incentive to decide correctly for some types of arbitrators.
Moreover, the analysis of appeal demonstrates a broader concern with providing infor-
mation about arbitrators’ past decisions. Although such information improves the selection
of arbitrators, it may come at the cost of some of those arbitrators who are not vetoed
rendering incorrect decisions only to avoid reputation for being biased. Whether this effect
is significant depends, as explained above, on the distribution of arbitrators’ types. When it
is, providing no information may prove better for prospective litigants.
7 Conclusion
If arbitration decisions were public and subject to appeal, their accuracy would be easily
evaluated by future litigants. They would then select arbitrators who are perceived to be
unbiased, and this, in turn, would motivate unbiased arbitrators to be as accurate as possible.
Yet, arbitration decisions are often concise and undetailed. The only public information
available about past decisions, if at all, concerns the final judgment. As we showed, such
truncated information, combined with private selection of arbitrators may drive arbitrators
to decide for one side only to avoid reputation as being biased in favor of the other. This
tendency would be stronger for less experienced arbitrators whose reputation as unbiased
has not yet been established.
Our analysis suggests few testable predictions. First, we expect inexperienced arbitra-
tors’ decisions to depend on their past decisions. Second, we predict that such dependency
would feature a tendency to ‘even up’ the win/loss rate of decisions rendered by each arbi-
trator. Third, we expect parties to veto not only arbitrators who, based on their individual
characteristics and past performance, feature a strong bias against them, but also to veto
those who feature a medium bias for them. Finally, we suggest that these predictions would
prove less significant as arbitrators become more experienced and establish longer history of
prior decisions. It should be emphasized that both measures of arbitrator neutrality - awards
and win-loss rates - have been mostly studied aggregatively, for certain types of arbitrations,
and not for individual arbitrators. We suggest that these measures should be studied on an
individual arbitrator level.
Future research may compare arbitration outcomes between different arbitration providers
and different arbitration contexts. It would be interesting to examine how does performance
of arbitrators compare across arbitration providers, and relate it to their selection mech-
anisms. Our findings may also prove significant when comparing private arbitration with
public adjudication. Indeed, various recent empirical studies demonstrate that arbitration is
often considered inefficient and undesirable among equally positioned and informed parties,
at the time of contracting.32 Whether that has to do with the incentive effects of private
selection of arbitrators is yet to be examined.
32See, e.g., Eisenberg and Miller (2007) who have examined over 2800 contracts filed with the Securities
Exchange Commission in 2002 by public firms. ***Reference to Hanseman****
Appendix (still need to finish some proofs ...)
Proof of Proposition 1. In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, an unbiased arbitrator βD
decides correctly once employed, and so would not be vetoed by the defendant if and only if
βD (1− λ+ λ (2p− 1)) + (1− βD) (2p− 1) ≥ δdD.
Note that a pro-defendant arbitrator decides in favor of the defendant with probability 1. Its
decision is appealed with probablity λ, and in this case, the defendant believes it would still
prevail with probability p, and so would obtain the expected payoff p (1) + (1− p (−1)) =
2p−1. The same argument implies that the expected payoff to the defendant if the arbitrator
is unbiased and decides correctly is also 2p− 1.
Similarly, an unbiased arbitrator βD would not be vetoed by the plaintiff if and only if
βD (− (1− λ) + λ (2p− 1)) + (1− βD) (2p− 1) ≥ δdP .
Rearrangement of the these two inequalities implies that an arbitrator βD would be
employed by the litigants if and only if
I ≡ 1− 2p+ δdD
2 (1− λ) (1− p) ≤ βD ≤
2p− 1− δdP
2p (1− λ) ≡ I.
The argument for βP is similar.
The interval
[
I, I
]
is nonempty because if it were empty, then arbitrators would not have
been employed in equilibrium. This implies that the litigants’ payoffs in equilibrium dP and
dD would have had to be equal zero. Inspection of the definitions of I and I reveals that
this implies that I < 0 < I. A contradiction.
Finally, I ≤ 0 because arbitrators can be either pro-defendant or pro-plaintiff and the
distribution of pro-defendant types is the mirror image of the distribution of pro-plaintiff
types. Suppose that I > 0. This means that the defendant vetoes any arbitrator who is not
sufficiently biased in its favor, or such that βD is not larger than or equal to I, and also
any arbitrator who is believed to be pro-plaintiff because such an arbitrator is even worse
from her perspective. By symmetry, the plaintiff would also veto any arbitrator that is such
that βP < I and any arbitrator who is believed to be pro-defendant or is even known to
be unbiased. It follows that no arbitrator can be employed in equilibrium and so that the
expected payoffs to the litigants, dP and dD, must be zero. As shown above, this implies a
contradiction. "
Proof of Proposition 2. In the third period it is employed, the arbitrator has no future
and so maximizes its payoff by rendering the correct decision. In the second period it is
employed, the arbitrator realizes that the most it can achieve by distorting its decision is to
increase the probability it would be employed again from zero to one. Thus, its maximal
payoff if it makes an incorrect decision in the second period is 0 + δ = δ, which is smaller
than its payoff if it makes the correct decision in the second period, which is 1. "
Proof of Proposition 3. An experienced unbiased arbitrator βD is believed to decide
correctly (by Proposition 2). The rest of the proof follows in the same way as the proof
of Proposition 1. Notice that the interval
[
Iex, Iex
]
is nonempty because if it were empty,
then experienced arbitrators would not have been employed in equilibrium. This means that
inexperienced unbiased arbitrators would have had no reason to care about their reputation
and so would also have decided correctly in the first period in which they are employed. But
then the fact that the interval
[
Iex, Iex
]
is empty implies that they too would not have been
employed in equilibrium, which implies that the litigants payoffs in equilibrium dP and dD
would have had to be equal zero. A contradiction. "
Proof of Proposition 4. If the litigants cannot appeal the arbitrator’s decision then
unbiased inexperienced arbitrators cannot bias their decisions and still hope to be employed
in equilibrium because they would surely be vetoed by at least one of the litigants. This
implies that unbiased arbitrators must decide correctly, if employed, in equilibrium.
If an inexperienced unbiased arbitrator decides correctly, the prior belief that the ar-
bitrator is pro-defendant is βD, and the arbitrator decides in favor of the defendant, then
Bayesian updating implies that the posterior belief that the arbitrator is pro-defendant is
βD
βD + (1− βD) ·
1
2
=
2βD
1 + βD
(1)
If the arbitrator decides in favor of the plaintiff, then the posterior belief that the arbitrator
is pro-defendant is zero.
The same argument implies that if the arbitrator’s type is βP , and the arbitrator decides
in favor of the plaintiff, then the posterior belief about the arbitrator is
2βP
1 + βP
If the arbitrator decides in favor of the defendant, then the posterior belief that the arbitrator
is pro-plaintiff is zero.
If the posterior probability that a (formerly) inexperienced arbitrator who decides cor-
rectly is pro-defendant after a decision in favor of the defendant (1) is smaller than or equal
to the threshold Iex, or if
2βD
1 + βD
≤ 2p− 1− δd
2p (1− λ)
or
βD ≤
2p− 1− δd
2p+ 1− 4λp+ δd ≡ β,
then if an inexperienced unbiased arbitrator βD decides its first dispute correctly, it follows
that regardless of its decision it would not be vetoed by the plaintiff in the second time it is
called to arbitrate a dispute. So in this case the arbitrator βD cannot do better by distorting
its decision, and hence would decide correctly in equilibrium and would not be vetoed. The
same argument implies that an arbitrator βP also cannot do better by distorting its decision,
and hence would decide correctly in equilibrium and would not be vetoed.
If, however,
βD > β,
and the arbitrator learns that the defendant is right, then if the arbitrator decides in favor of
the defendant, this would be its last decision because it would be vetoed by the plaintiff in
the next time it is called to arbitrate a dispute. But if it decides in favor of the plaintiff, then
because this would reveal that the arbitrator is unbiased, the arbitrator may get to make
two more decisions if it is not vetoed by the defendant. So deciding correctly cannot be part
of equilibrium if such an arbitrator is employed. It therefore follows that that arbitrator
βD > min
{
β, Iex
}
cannot be employed in equilibrium. If β < βD then the arbitrator does
not decide correctly and for this reason is not employed as explained above; and if Iex < βD
then the arbitrator is not employed even if it is believed to decide correctly in equilibrium."
Proof of Proposition 5. To be added. "
Proof of Proposition 6. The argument that inexperienced unbiased arbitrators who are
employed decide the case correctly if βD, βP ≤ β, and decide in favor of the plaintiff and
defendant, respectively, if βD, βP > β is the same as in the proof of Proposition 3.
Lemma. If an inexperienced unbiased arbitrator βD or βP is believed to bias its decision
as much as possible in favor of the plaintiff or defendant, respectively, then it would be
employed if and only if
I in ≤ βD, βP ≤ I in.
This interval is non-empty for every value of λ > 0 and p ≥ 1/2 provided that δd ≤
λ (2p− 1).
Proof. Suppose that inexperienced unbiased arbitrators βD are believed to bias their de-
cisions in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant does not veto an inexperienced arbitrator if
and only if
βD (1− λ+ λ (p− (1− p))) + (1− βD) (pλ+ (1− pλ) (−1)) ≥ δdD
if and only if
βD ≥
1− 2pλ+ δdD
2− 2λ ≡ I in.
The plaintiff does not veto an inexperienced arbitrator if and only if
βD (− (1− λ) + λ (p− (1− p))) + (1− βD) (1− λ+ λ (p− (1− p))) ≥ δdP
if and only if
βD ≤
1− 2λ (1− p)− δdP
2 (1− λ) ≡ I in.
The argument for βP is similar.
Algebraic manipulation shows that I in ≥ I in if and only if
2λ (2p− 1) ≥ δdP + δdD
or if d ≤ λ (2p− 1) . "
The Lemma implies that if an arbitrator βD or βP is believed to bias its decision in favor
of the plaintiff or defendant, respectively, then it would be hired if and only if
I in ≤ βD, βP ≤ I in.
Thus, the equilibrium depends on the relationship among min
{
β, Iex
}
, I in, and I in as
follows:
1. If
min
{
β, Iex
}
< I in,
then for small values of βD or βP
(
βD, βP ≤ min
{
β, Iex
})
the arbitrator is hired and
decides correctly; for low-intermediate values of βD or βP (min
{
β, Iex
}
< βD, βP ≤
I in) the arbitrator distorts as much as possible in favor of the plaintiff or defen-
dant, respectively, and is vetoed by the defendant or plaintiff, respectively; for high-
intermediate values of βD or βP
(
I in < βD, βP ≤ I in
)
the arbitrator distorts as much
as possible in favor of the plaintiff or defendant, respectively, and is hired; and for
high values of βD or βP
(
I in < βD, βP
)
the arbitrator distorts as much as possible in
favor of the plaintiff or defendant, respectively, but is still vetoed by the plaintiff or
defendant, respectively.
2. If
I in ≤ min
{
β, Iex
}
< I in,
then for small values of βD or βP
(
βD, βP ≤ β
)
the arbitrator is hired and decides
correctly; for intermediate values of βD or βP
(
β < βD, βP ≤ I in
)
the arbitrator dis-
torts as much as possible in favor of the plaintiff or defendant, respectively, and is
vetoed by the defendant or plaintiff, respectively; and for high values of βD or βP(
I in < βD, βP
)
the arbitrator distorts as much as possible in favor of the plaintiff or
defendant, respectively, but is still vetoed by the plaintiff or defendant, respectively.
3. If
I in ≤ I in < β,
then for small values of βD or βP
(
βD, βP ≤ β
)
the arbitrator is hired and decides
correctly; and for high values of βD or βP
(
β < βD, βP
)
the arbitrator distorts as
much as possible in favor of the plaintiff or defendant, respectively, but is still vetoed
by the plaintiff or defendant, respectively.
4. Finally, if
I in > I in
then inexperienced unbiased arbitrators are employed in equilibrium if and only if
βD, βP ≤ min
{
β, Iex
}
. "
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